



I.ISUMMARY CONDEMNATION OF NUISANCES.
- L
Of the general extent of this power, aside from special
and positive legislative enactment, there is no better state-
ment than is contained in the language used by a distin-
guished Justice, in directing an injunction against a threat-
ened destructive abatement of a wharf which had been de-
clared a nuisance by a special ordinance passed under an act
of the State Legislature, authorizing the City of Milwaukee
to establish wharf and dock lines and prevent encroachmeits
or obstructions in the two rivers passing through that munici-
pality:-
But the mere declaration of the City Council of Milwaukee, that a cer-
tain structure was an encroachment or obstruction, did not make it so,
nor could such a declaration makd it a nuisance unless it in fact had that
character. It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a
municipal corporation, without any general laws either of the City or of
the State, within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance
can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any
person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the City itself. This would
place every house, every business, and all the property of the City, at the
uncontrolled will of the temporary local authorities: MILLiER, I., Yates v.
City of u7iwaukee (1871), io Wall. (77 U. S.) 497, 505.
These principles have been frequently recognized: thus,
in Arkansas, by SmITH, J., Ward v. City of Little Rock
(1883), 41 Ark. 526, 53o , refusing an injunction against
working convicts in the streets of Little Rock; in Colorado,
by STONE, J., City of Denver v. Mullen (1884), 7. Col. 347,
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353-4, where he declared that only certain kinds of nui-
sances, such as those affecting health, or the safety of person
or property, or tangible street obstructions presenting an
emergency, could be summarily abated by the public; in IB-
linois, by SHELDON, J., King et al. v. Davenport, Exr.
(I88I), 98 11. 305, 316, where he distinguished the destruc-
tion of a wooden roof by the fire marshal, in obedience to
the city ordinance, because the ordinance had been passed
long before, and the roof itself had the character of a nui-
sance; and previously, in Chicago, R. I & Pacific R. R.
Co. v. City of Joliet (I875), 79 Ill. 25, 44, where the opera-
tion of a railroad according to its franchise was solemnly de-
dared a nuisance by the city fathers and a bill filed for abate-
ment ; in Iowa, where shade trees were condemned: Everett
v. The City of Council Bluffs (1877), 46 Iowa 66, 67 ; in
Missiippi, in the case of a planing mill: Lake v. City of
Aberdeen (1879), 57 Miss. 270; Green v. Lake (1882), 6o
Id. 451.
It is not intended in this article to develop the law of
nuisances further than reasonably necessary to illustrate the
limits of the particular municipal power of summarily con-
demning a nuisance; assuming knowledge of the principles
of this branch of law or access to the text books wherein it
has been stated, this article will the more closely adhere to
that narrow but important part of the law of nuisance indi-
cated in its title, without restating the general underlying
principles.
One caution is to be observed: over and above the nuisances
recognized at common law, there can be no doubt of the
sufficiency of the State's police power to authorize the legis-
lature to declare acts or things to be nuisances which other-
wise would not be so in law: Altgler v. Kansas (1887), 123
U. S. 623, 66o (distillery); Comm. v. Alger (1851), 7 Cush.
(Mass.) 53, 84, 95, per SHAW, C. J. (wharf beyond the estab-
lished lines); Vanderbuilt v. Adams (1827), 7 Cowan (N. Y.)
349 (anchoring vessels); Lawton et al. v. Steele (189o), rig
N. Y. 226, 233, per ANDREWS, J. (infra); Carleton v. Rugg
(1889), 149 Mass. 550 (liquor saloon); Weller v. Snover
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(1880), 42 N. J. Law 341 (fish trap); Shivers v. Ne-wton
(1883), 45 Id. 469, 473-4, per REED, J. (adulteration of milk).
Consequently a legislative declaration that anything shall beconsidered a nuisance, excludes evidence that the thing isnot a nuisance in fact: DEVENS, J., Train v. Bosion Diin-
fecding Co. (1887), 144 Mass. 523, 531 (imported rags). With
such declarations, this article has nothing to do, as it would
involve a discussion of the fundamentals of the State's police
power. This is a completely severable and much more ele-
mentary subject than is here discussed.
'I.
There seems to be no reasonable doubt of the power tosummarily destroy or remove nuisances, without judicial
trial or process. It "was an established principle of common
law long before the adoption of" any American Constitu-
tion, and "it has never been supposed that this common lawprinciple was abrogated by the" constitutional provisions
"for the protection of life, liberty and property, * * *although the exercise of the right might result in the de-struction of property": ANDREWS, J., speaking especially ofthe Constitution of New York, in Lawton et al. v. Steele
(189o), 119 N.Y. 226, 235. To thesame effect is the language
of MAGIE, J., quoted, in/ra, page 176, and the opinions of
Vice-Chancellor DODD, in Manhattan ffg. & Fert. Co. v.1 n Keuren (1872), 23 N. J. Eq. 251, and of SUTHERLAND,
J., in Coe v. Shultz (1866), 47 Barb. 64 (both the latter cases
arising from offensive manufactures).
Consequent upon the existence of the power of summary
abatement, is that of delegating its exercise to executive
officers, to proceed without the delay of judicial proceedings,
"in cases analogous to those where the remedy by summary
abatement existed at common law": ANDREWS, J., Lawton
et al. v. Steele (189o), 119 N. Y. 226, 238, and infra, page 167.
III.
The fundamental error in almost every instance of a c6n-tested declaration of nuisance by a municipality, arises from
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a curious assumption that the declaration is final and indis-
putable in any action subsequently brought The authori-
ties for condemning the error are chiefly considered herein,
under the division of nuisances prejudicial to the public
health, though some appear also under those obstructing
public highways and those dangerous to life and property.
They all deny to a municipality the power to declare that to
be a nuisance which is not such in law. Some of these au-
thorities are: Hittton v. City of Camden (1876), 39 N.J.
Law 122 (infra); Newark &c. Rwy. Ca. v. Hunt (1888), 50
Id. 308 (glandered horses); Baldwin v. Heizman (i885), 47
Id. 280 (division line); !T/eford v. The People (1865), 14
Mich. 41, 47, per CAMPBELL, J. (maintaining a slaughter
house); The Village of St. John v. JcFarlan (1875), 33
Mich. 72, 74, per MARSTON, J. (wooden building); The City
ofHannibal v. Richards (1884), 82 Mo. 330 (grading a lot);
Darst et al. v. The People (1869), 51 Ill. 286, per LAWRENCE,
J. (indictment for riot in forcibly seizing liquors); Barling
v. West et al. (1871), 29 Wis. 307, which was caused by a
lemonade stand; the market stall case, where this language
was used:
It may well be doubted whether the legislature can delegate to anybody
of men the power to declare what is or what is not a nuisance. Such
power would be equal to a power to declare what should bea criminalact;
because it is a crime to maintain a public nuisance, and if the legislature
,can delegate to individuals the power to define a nuisance, they can dele-
gate to them the power to make acts criminal which are not so by law.
Such a power cannot be delegated to others by the legislature. They
mayauthorize boards of health to pass ordinances necessary for the objects
of their creation, but they cannot delegate to them the power to define
what shall be a nuisance, or make acts criminal which the law holds to be
innocent: INGRAHAM1, J., Mayor, &'c., of New York v. The Board of
Healtl (i866), 31 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 385, 396.
A curious illustration of the erroneous principle under dis-
cussion, is found in the case of Green v. The Mayor &
Aldermen of Savannah (1849), 6 Ga. I. The municipality,
under their power to remove all nuisances, had prohibited
the cultivation of rice on an island within the City limits.
Green cultivated rice in defiance of the ordinance, and when
BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES. I61
summoned before the City Council, endeavored to prove that
the cultivation of his rice did not endanger the public health.
Failing to prevent the condemnation, Green then removed
the case by certiorari into the Superior Court, where he
failed again. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court,
speaking by WARNER, J., considered that the discretionary
power over nuisances made the municipal authorities the
sole and exclusive judges of the existence of the facts upon
which the exercise of the power depended, so that their de-
termination of the existence of a nuisance, arising from the.
cultivation of the rice, was conclusive.
To these citations may be added some remarks which will
lead up to a consideration of the origin of the assumed final-
ity of municipal declarations of nuisance, without further
examination of such power of a municipality. It must be
remembered that this article deals with the effect of a sum-
mary condemnation of a nuisance, and not with the muni-
cipal power in general over nuisances.
We do not at all question the general proposition, which has been ar-
gued with so much elaboration by appellant's counsel [W. C. Goudy],
that under a general grant of power over nuisances, like the one in ques-
tion, town authorities have no power to pass an ordinance declaring a
thing a nuisance which in fact is clearly not one. The adoption of such
an ordinance would not be a legitimate exercise of the power granted, but
on the contrary, would be an abuse of it. But in doubtful cases, where a
thing may or may not be a nuisance, depending upon a variety of cir-
cumstances requiring judgment and discretion on the part of the town au-
thorities in exercising their legislative functions, under a general delega-
tion of power like the one we are considering, their action under such cir-
cumstances, wouldbe conclusive of the question. - * Andsowe
regard the use of steam in the manner specified in the ordinance, for the
purpose of propelling street cars along a public street in a thickly popu-
lated town in the absence of any legislative grant authorizing it to be
done. Such a use of steam, under the circumstances stated, is per se, a
nuisance: MULKEY, J., N. Ckicago City Ry. Co. v. Lake View (1883), io5
Ill. 207, 212, 213.
This case originated in the Criminal Court of Cook
County, where the Railway Company was convicted of vio-
lating the town ordinance by propelling its cars by steam
power. The conviction was affirmed.
VOL. XXX-Ir
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I The principles contained in these remarks of Judge MUL-
xEY were applied to the eniission of dense smoke from the
chimney of a tug boat, contrary to the city ordinance, in
Harmon v. City of Chicago (1884), 110 111. 40o, and were
approved by ELLIOTT, J., in Baumgartner v. Hasty (1884),
IOO Ind. 575, 577-8, where the Court declared lawful the
summary destruction of a wooden shed maintained in viola-
tion of the city ordinance. And again, in the case of a
steam grist mill, the Court saying:
The charter of Aberdeen confers on it, power to " prevent and remove
all nuisances." We agree with counsel in the assertion that this grant of
power does not authorize the town to declare that to be a nuisance which
is not, and destroy property or interfere with individual rights improperly
under the pretence of preventing or removing nuisances; but the town
has power to prevent and remove what comes within the legal notice of a
nuisance, and, according to the petition in this case, the establishment
complained of, was a nuisance, because of its condition and surroundings:
CAMPBELL, C. J., Green v. Lake (1882), 6o Miss. 451, 456.
Hence the cause of the error, that a summary municipal
declaration of a nuisance is final, seems to be in the ne-
cessity for the exercise of a wide discretion by municipal
authorities in the use of prompt and decisive measures:
WELLS, J., City of Salem v. Eastern RR. Co. (I868), 98
Mass. 431, 446. In this cited case, the extent of destruc-
tive powers, the compensation of the owner of the property,
and the persons liable to the owner, were not decided, as
the case went off on a denial of the finality of the mu-
nicipal declaration of a nuisance. In other words, this ci-
tation belongs with the class of cases arising out of lawful
trades which become a nuisance by the manner of their
conduct: DEVENS, J., Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co.
(1887), 144 Mass. 523, 530.
The exercise of discretion in determining whether a par-
ticular thing falls within a category of condemned acts or
conditions, is said to belong to a quasi judicial rather than
ministerial power in time municipality: BIGELOw, C. J.,
Belcher et al. v. Farrar (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 325, 327,
(infra); per VAN SYCKEL, J., in State, Marshal, Pros. v.
Street Commissioner of Trenton (1873), 36 N. J. Law 283,
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285 (tannery); EARL, C. J., Under-wood v. Green (1870), 42
N. Y. 140, 142 (infra). In the former of these cases, the
learned Judge administered the corrective to this classifica-
tion, taken in the abstract, by grounding the immediate
application of such power, without that preliminary hearing
which justice requires, upon a subsequent occasion for the
orderly presentation of the truth to a court of justice. In
part, lie said:
The unrestrained enjoyment of property by its owner is an abstract right
but it is to be exercised in subordination to another rule equally clear, em-
bodied in the maxim, Expedil reiibublicno ze sua re quis male utalur. So
the right of the subject to the liberty of his person is indisputably dear;
but it cannot be enjoyed if the good of society requires his restraint, or if
the rights of others will be endangered or lost if he is permitted to go free.
It is therefore no violation of principle to suspend the appropriation of
private property to a particular use alleged to be hurtful and injurious to
others, until it can be ascertained judicially whether such allegation is
well founded; nor can it be said to be an unlawful infringement of the
libertv of the citizen to arrest him on a charge of crime, or on an allega-
tion of injury to the person or property of third persons, until it can be
determined whether his release will be consistent with the peace and good
order of society, or a due regard to the security and preservation of the
rights of others. It is upon this ground that courts of equity are empow-
ered to issue injunctions to restrain the use of property, and courts of law
are authorized to issue writs and warrants for the arrest of the person.
Such processes are only preliminary. They do not conclude the rights of
parties, but are merely the initiatory steps in the administration of jus-
tice, which, when followed up in due course of law, will lead to judgments
by which those rights can be finally adjudicated and settled. Of this na-
ture are the proceedings in controversy in the presznt case: BIGELOW, C.
J.. Belcheri el al. v. Farrar (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 325, 329.
This case was a bill in equity by the municipal authorities
for an injunction against an oil refinery, and the particular
point for decision was the power of the board of health to
forbid the use of the refinery, without first notifying its
owner. An affirmative response was given by the Supreme
Judicial Court of the State, for the reasons already mentioned.
The same resul t was reached in deciding an action of trespass
against the owner of a barn and sheds, which had been
pulled down at the direction of the board of health, in Van
Wormer v. ,Vayor &c. of Albany (Y836), 15 Wend. (N. Y.)
262.
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The classification of this municipal power as quasi judicial,
should not be pressed too far upon the authority of the case
cited, as it was made with reference to the local statute, and
"in the sense that it is not to be contested or revised, ex-
cept in the manner provided in the statute" : GRAY, C. J.,
Taunton v. Taylor (1874), I16 Mass. 254, 261 (bone boiling);
Sawyer v. State Board of Healtk (1878), 125 Id. 182
(slaughter house); Comm. v. Young (1883), 135 Id. 526
(keeping swine). The principle upon which the classifica-
tion is made, however, is of general application, as will be
seen from some consideration of the cases arising out of the
great fire in New York City, in 1835 (infra, page 189).
IV.
Recognizing the fundamental principles, that the declara-
tion of a nuisance is a proceeding of a judicial nature, and
that no such proceeding can validly affect person or prop-
erty, without hearing, the curious claim is sometimes made
by municipalities, that the owner will be deprived of his
remedies at law or in equity, unless he appear and contest
before the municipal officers charged with the determination
of the question of nuisance. It should be enough to recall
that proceedings in court are. not by way of appeal from the
decision of the municipality: WELLS, J., City of Salem v.
Eastern RR. Co. (1868), 98 Mass. 431, 447, and therefore
pleading before the municipal officers has no legal result.
An avoidance of litigation may, of course, follow, from con-
vincing the officers of the error of their proposed action.
This general statement is made subject to the provisions of
special statutes giving an appeal from the municipal action,
as in City of Taunton v. Taylor (1874), 116 Mass. 254, where
GRAY, C. J. (page 261,) distinguished the case of City of
Salem v. Eastern RR. Co. on this particular ground. In
this respect, but requiring compliance with the statutory di-
rections by the municipal officers, a similar case is that of
Comm. v. Young (1883), 135 Mass. 526, 529.
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V.
If the municipal authorities are dealing with a nuisance
at common law or by statute, they must be prepared to
establish such facts as will prove the nuisance; they cannot
justify under any municipal declaration, because no such
power is conferred by a general authority to "abate any
nuisance": Hennessy v. City of St. Paid (1889), U. S. C.
Ct. D. Minn., 37 Fed. Repr. 565. Here, a partially burned
house was pulled down, under a resolution of the common
council, and no facts being established to prove the existence
of a nuisance, save the resolution, the City was properly
mulcted in damages. Similarly, Cole v. KAegler (1884), 64
Iowa 59 (destruction of a dwelling), and Joyce v. Woods
(1880), 78 Ky. 386 (draining a lot). In a Georgia City, the
Mayor and other City officials were about destroying a mill
pond as a nuisance, when a flood relieved them of the neces-
sity: the injunction subsequently granted to the owner
against the City officers was dismissed, because the wrong
person had been enjoined, "for the Almighty had already
abated the nuisance." But the Court took occasion to say
also that:
Whenever the City authorities proceed in the summary manner au-
thorized by their charter, they do so at their peril. The owner of the
pond in this case would not have been remediless at law. He would have
had a right, in a suit at law, to establish, if he could, that the pond was
not a nuisance; and if he could show that to the satisfaction of the jury,
he would be entitled to such damages as he had sustained by the sum-
mary action of the City authorities. It would be a great wrong upon the
people living in crowded cities, to hold that, in every case of nuisance,
affecting perhaps the lives of hundreds or thousands of the inhabitants, the
city authorities would have to go through a long and tedious trial before
a court and jury, before they could abate or abolish the nuisance. But,
as said before, when they do act, they must be certain that they are right,
and that the thing abated is a nuisance, or they will subject themunicipal-
ity to damages: SIm MONS, J., City of Americus v. Alitchell (I888), S. Ct.
Ga., 5 S. R. Repr. 20r, 202.
The same recognition of the right of the owners and other
aggrieved persons to appeal to a court of justice against arbi-
trary or wanton exercise of municipal authority, appears in
Ha;vey v. Dewoody et al. (1856), 18 Ark. 252, 261 (unoccu-
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pied house); State v. Molt (1883), 61 Md. 297, 308 (lime
kiln); Manhallan Mfg. & Fert. Co. v. Van Keuren (1872),
23 N. J. Eq. 251, 256 (manufactory of fertilizers); Combton
v. Waco Bridge Co. (1883),62 Texas, 715, 719 (fences).
Another and perhaps more familiar aspect of the right to
judicial investigation, has been expressed in the decision of
a suit for the penalty fixed by the City of Baltimore upon all
esons'erecting or carrying on a distillery of spirits, turpen-
tine or varnish, or factories for earthen or stone ware, soap
and candles, or slaughter houses; the ordinance had been
adopted under a power conferred by the legislature, to pre-
vent fires and nuisances.
The validity of many ordinances is at once perceived, because they ap-
pear upon the face of them to be in the execution of a delegated power.
Of this character, for example, would be such ordinances as relate to the
'laying oht of new streets, the establishment of night watches, the erection
of lamps, the providing for the general survey of the city, laws for cleaning
and deepening the basin, and many other powers of the like description,
which it is unnecessary to enumerate.
But the power to prevent fires and the power to remove nuisances, are
grants of a totally different description, and there may be just, necessary
and proper exercises of these powers, which the court cannot judicially
see. Thus, whether the various manufactories spoken of [sup ra] in the
Seventeenth section of the ordinance, are.calculated to endanger the hab-
itations, or the health of the inhabitants, may be a matter of science, upon
which possibly a diversity of views might be entertained, and thus the
legitimate exercise of the power might become a mixtquestion of law and
of fact. The city authorities might pronounce that to be a nuisance,
which evidence might show was not a nuisance. They might prohibit a
particular occupation upon the ground that it increased the danger of fire,
when the reverse could be shown by the concurring testimony of all men.
The power, therefore, or the want of power, to suppress a particular occu-
pation as a nuisance, or as a means of preventing fire, should be shown
in proof.
It is true the corporation have power to pass all laws, which are neces-
sary or proper to carry into effect any given power, and the degree of its
necessity or propriety would not be minutely, or critically scrutinized;
but the court ought to see that it may be the means of accomplishing the
object of the grant. The degree of necessity would, indeed, be properly,
perhaps, the subject for the judgment of the corporation, but that it con-
tributes in any degree, would be for the determination of the court.
Now that the prevention of such occupations as are, under certain cir-
cumstances, prohibited by the ordinances under consideration, would, in
any degree, be a means of preventing fires, or of removing nuisances, must
be disclosed by evidence. None is produced, and we therefore think,
BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.
upon this ground, the court were wrong in their direction to the jury, that
if they found the facts proven in the bill of exceptions to be true, they
must find for the plaintiff: ARCHrER, J., Glenn v. The lMayor (1833), 5
Gill &J. (Md.) 424, 428-9.
VI.
The necessity for vindicating the peremptory orders of
municipalities, has led to judicial interference by injunction
to restrain the abatement of what the land owner or occu-
pant denied to be a nuisance. This jurisdiction is defended
not only from precedent, but still more from a sound reason
that thereby an officer required to proceed summarily, and
of course under the liability of a future action, may secure
a judicial decree upon the legality of his proposed action:
BECK, C. J., Bolton v. lfcSlane (1885), 67 Iowa 207, 209
(fence). Hence, the jurisdiction over road supervisors in
that State has been exercised for a long time: Id. And in
cases where the question is whether an obstruction in a street
is a nuisance, the land owner, or other aggrieved person,
may also have an injunction to prevent the contemplated
action, until hearing in court: Bills v. Belkwafi (1873), 36
Iowa 583, 585 (growing trees); Everett v. The City of
Council Bltfs (1877), 46Id. 66, and Quinlonv. Burlon (883),
6I Id. 471, 476 (shade trees); Everett v. The City of Afar-
quette (1884), 53 Mich. 450, where COOLEY, C. J., sustained
an injunction against the removal of basement steps upon
the municipal declaration that they were illegal without
proof of interference with the public, adding that People ,%
Carpenter (ifra, page 184,) had "never been doubted in this
State."
A good illustration of this exercise of equitable jurisdic-
'ion by injunction appears in a Mississippi case:
Appellant states that an ordinance was passed by the corporate authori-
ties of the town of Shieldsboro, ordering him to remove his lumber from
his lot, as described in the bill, on the bank of the Bay of St. Louis; that
he was a dealer in lumber, as well as a merchant of the place; that they
"caused the marshal of said City to give him notice to remove or destroy
said lumber within five days, or they would have it removed or destroyed
by force." The bill further alleges, that no cause or reasons have been
given for the issuance of the order for the removing or for the destroying
of his lumber.
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These allegations, we think, show good grounds for relief. It cannot
be seriously contended that the corporate authorities ofa town can, by an
arbitrary ordinance, destroy private property by force, or compel the
owner of it to have it removed, unless it was a nuisance, and so declared
in the ordinance, and shown to be such by its location, or by the sanitary
condition of the city or town : SHACKELFORD, C. J., Pieri v. .31ayor etc.
(1869), 42 Miss. 493, 495-
The jurisdiction was also exercised in Northwestern Fer-
tilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1878), 7 Otto (97 U. S.) 659,
though the question chiefly agitated there was the extent of
the State's police power, and not its summary application.
This was also the case in K~ennedy v. Peters (I855), Io La.
Ann. 227, where a hide-curing establishment had been con-
demned.
As will again appear, with regard especially to street ob-
structions (infra, page 18o), and nuisances prejudicial to the
public health (page 175), a court of equity will not restrain
a mere trespass, or grant an injunction, unless the complain-
ant's right is free from doubt, or the injury would be irre-
parable, and not susceptible of legal compensation in dam-
ages. Such was the emphatic ruling of the Court in the
leading case of Hart v. Mayor &c. of Albany (1832), 9
Wend. (N. Y.) 571, where an injunction was refused against
the threatened destructive abatement of a float in the canal
basin at that City. It is not possible to enter into an exami-
nation of this branch of equitable jurisdiction; nor is it
necessary, as there is nothing peculiar in its application to
the restraints of summary abatements by municipal author-
ity of suppressed nuisances. It is enough to emphasize that
the foundation of this jurisdiction is the proof to be offered
to the chancellor against the municipal declarations.
VII.
In declaring anything a nuisance, care must be taken to
proceed against the actual nuisance, and not against some-
thing subsidiary or merely contributory. Such an error
will afford good ground for the recovery of damages. The
general principle involved may be otherwise stated, that
property is not to be destroyed beyond what is needful to
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abate a nuisance: GRAvrs, J., Sliepard v. Peofle (1879), 40
Mich. 487, 492 (mill dam), and iessersmidt v. People (i88i),
46 Id. 437, 438 (refuse from glue factory); Brighlyman v.
Bristol (1876), 65 Me. 426 (porgy oil factory); Gray v.
Aj,res cl al. (1838), 7 Dana (Ky.) 375 (tarring and feathering
a receiver of stolen goods). Thus, in Verder v. Ellsworth
(1887), 59 Vt. 354, a fence was condemned as a nuisance
and torn down by the village trustees, though the fence was
proved not to have been a nuisance, but merely a screen
behind which trespassers committed the nuisance. The
owner recovered damages for the trespass, though the re-
moval of the fence so exposed the trespassers that they
ceased to commit the nuisance. In other words, the removal
of the fence could only be justified after a condemnation of
the nuisance, and not of the fence, and then only as the
proper means of abatement of the nuisance. There might
have been other methods of preventing the recurrence of
the nuisance, such as the services of a watch dog or the
cultivation of prickly bushes.
Similarly, in Mfiller v. Buzrc (1869), 32 Texas 2o8, the
destruction of an unoccupied and dilapidated stable was con-
sidered to be ground for damages, because "the nuisance was
not caused by the" stable, "but by the persons who resorted
there," as in the Vermont case, at the call of nature, and
that was the nuisance which could have been suppressed
without the demolition of the building. The reasoning of
this opinion does proceed upon the ground that the build-
ings in which people misbehave themselves, are not
nuisances, as well as those in which noxious trades are
carried on, because it is the abuse of the building which
makes the nuisance. But the fact remains that the demoli-
tion was not necessary, and therefore the principles of Mug-
le; v. KCansas (1883), 123 U. S. 623 need be no more than
generally referred to as matter of caution in using this
authoritv.
Similarly, a "ball alley" could not be removed as a
nuisance because its proprietor permitted disorderly persons
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to play at ten pins: Bloomhuffv. The State (1846), 8 Black-
ford (Ind.) 205.
The destruction of a house of ill fame by a city marshal,
under a resolution of the City Council of Detroit, again
raised the question of abating the nuisance by destroying
the house where the thing was practiced. The Court was
disposed to deny the power of the legislature to authorize the
municipalities to destroy, perchance, the most costly edifice
in the city, if the abode of the vicious and profligate; but
beyond indicating the bias of the judicial mind, this subject
may be passed over for the consideration of the method of
abating the nuisance. Holding the municipality to the
same strict but reasonable power of abatement already men-
tioned, the Court said:
The law undoubtedlyauthorizes the Corporation of Detroit, or any per-
son residing within the limits, to abate any nuisance that may exist. This
right is one of the few exceptions to the general rule that no man shall
take the law into his own hands ; the exception finds its vindication in
the law of necessity. It is a right, however, to be exercised with caution.
Care must be taken that nothing is done but what is absolutely necessary
to abate the nuisance.
Let us apply the rule contended for by the defendants to the present
case. It is said that the house is a, nuisance. This may be very true;
but it was a nuisance in consequence of its being the resort of persons of
ill fame. That which constitutes or causes the nuisance, maybe removed;
thus, if a house is used for the purpose of a trade or business, by which
the health of the public is endangered, the nuisance may be abated, by
removing whatsoever may be necessary to prevent the exercise of such
trade or business; so a house in which gaming is carried on, to the injury
of the public morals; the individual by whom it is occupied may be pun-
ished by indictment, and the implementsof gamingremoved; and a house
in which indecent and obscene pictures are exhibited, is a nuisance which
may be abated by the removal of the pictures. Thousands of young men
are lured to our public theatres, in consequence of their being the resort,
'nightly, of the profligate and abandoned; this is a nuisance. Yet in this,
and in the other cases stated, it will not be contended that a person would
be justified in demolishing the house, for the obvious reason that to sup-
press the nuisance such an act was unnecessary.
But surely the destruction of the house did not abate the nuisance ; the
cause still remained ; its inmates would resort to other receptacles of vice ;
and in no respect would the public morals be promoted. In this, and the
like cases, the only remedy for the mischief is to apply the stringent pro-
visions of our criminal law [and indict the persons offending] : 1VnPL,
J., Welch v. Stowell (1846), 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332, 341-2.
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A New York case will further illustrate the principle here
under consideration. The City of Buffalo threatened to fill
up a canal which was a valuable appurtenant to Babcock's
lot. He was allowed to prove that the nuisance of stagnant
water and filth could be removed without filling the water-
way, and was in fact caused by the negligence of the City,
under its charter powers, in not preserving the canal in a
navigable condition. The lot owner was therefore entitled
to an injunction: Babcock v. City of Buffalo et a?. (1874), 56
N. Y. 268. This case was recognized as good law by AN-
DREWS, J., in Lawton et al. v. Steele, to be mentioned
presently.
The Michigan decision just mentioned, was made with
especial regard to Mfeeker v. Van Rensaeller (1836), 15
Wend. (N. Y.) 397, where a disused tan house had become
tenanted by foreigners and extremely. filthy, during the
prevalence of cholera. The building was pulled down, un-
der the direction of the Board of Health, as a nuisance, and
the proof established that the destruction of the building was
the only way to correct the evil. The proof being the other
way in the Michigan case, the judgment was accordingly for
damages. The same principle governed Ferguson v. City of
Selma (1869), 43 Ala. 398, where the houses were admitted
to be of no intrinsic value, though yielding a fair rental.
The proof showed that the City authorities had condemned
these shanties because of their filthy condition, their age and
dilapidation, their owner's refusal to repair, though he was
of sufficient financial ability, their situation in an improving
and flourishing part of the city, and their occupancy by ten-
ants afflicted with small pox. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Chancellor's refusal to enjoin the City from removing
these tenements, on the express grounds that the owner's
rights were not illegally assailed, and, of course, not threat-
ened with irreparable damage.
So far as the right to abate was concerned, Mfeeker v.
Van Rensaeller has recently been recognized in Lawon et
al. v. Steele (189o), ii N. Y. 226, 236-7, by ANDREWS, J.,
where the learned Judge continued the discussion beyond
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the power of the municipality upwards into the constitu-
tional restraint upon the legislative power. Of courze, the
delegation to a municipality is limited by the bounds of le-
gitimate legislative action.
Where a publienuisance consists in the location or use of tangible person-
al property, so as to interfere with or obstruct a public right or regulation,
asin the case of the float in the Albany basin (Hart el al. v. The Mayor &c.
of-Albany, [1832] 9 Wend. [N. Y.] 571), or the Lfish] nets in the present
case, the legislature may, we think, authorize its summary abatement by
executive agencies without resort to judicial proceedings, and any injury
or destruction of the property, necessarily incident to the exercise of the
summary jurisdiction, interferes with no legal right of the owner. But
the legislature cannot go further. It cannot decree the destruction or for-
feiture of property used so as to constitute a nuisance as a punishment of
the wrong, nor even, as we think, to prevent a future illegal use of the
property, it not being a nuisance per se, and appoint officers to execute
its mandate. The plain reason is that due process of law requires a hear-
ing and trial before punishment, or before forfeiture of property can be ad-
judged for the owner's misconduct. Such legislation would be a plain
usurpation by the legislature ofjudicial powers, and under guise of exer-
cising the power of summary abatement of nuisance, the legislature cannot
take into its own hands the enforcement of the Criminal or quasi Criminal
law. (See opinion of SHAw, C. J., in Fisher v. McGirr [18541, 1 Gray
[Mass.] i [s. C. 2 AmERICAN LAW REGISTER, 0. S. 460], and in Brown
v. Perkins [1858], 12 Id. 89. [These were cases of violent entry and
seizure of liquor in the former, and vinegar in the latter.]
The inquiry in the present case comes to this: Whether the destruction
of the nets set in violation of the law, -authorized and required by the act
of 1883, is simply a proper, reasonable and necessary regulation for the
abatement of the nuisance, or transcends that purpose, and is to be re-
garded as the imposition and infliction of a forfeiture of the owner's right
of property in the nets, in the nature of a punishment. We regard the
case as very near the border line, but we think the legislation may be
fairly sustained on the ground that the destruction of nets so placed is a
reasonable incident of the power to abate the nuisance. The owner of the
nets isdeprivedofhis property, but not as a direct object of the law, but
as an incident to the abatement of the nuisance. * * * It is conceiv-
able that nets illegally set, could, with the use of care, be removed with-
out destroying them. But in view of their position, the difficulty attend-
ing their removal, the lability to injury in the process, their compar-
atively small value, we think the legislature could adjudge their destruc-
tion as a reasonable means of abatingthe nuisance: ANDREws, J., Lawton
el al. v. Steele (189o), 119 N. Y. 226, 239-40.
As this article deals with municipal, and not State power,
to summarily condemn, the subject may be dropped here,
the following cases being mentioned as in the same line of
BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.
thought: Shivers v. Newton (1883), 45 N. J. Law 469, 474
(adulteration of milk); Holyoke ComPany v. Lyman (1873),
15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 59o (mill dam).
Where notice is given, the duty of the municipality is in
fact much simpler than the proceeding against a house, or
fence, or some other thing: it is merely to inform the owner
or other responsible person of the nature and locality of the
supposed nuisance, so that he may, according to his own
choice, abate the complaint and so secure himself from in-
trusion under the police power of the municipality: WELLS,
J., City of Salem v. Eastern RR. Co. (1868), 98 Mass. 431,
444, where the real nuisance was the filth collected in a
pond, and not the railroad embankment which stopped the
escape of this filth.
VIII.
The limits upon summary abatement of nuisances preju-
dicial to the public health are well illustrated by a provision
of the New Jersey Act establishing State and Local Boards
of Health, in section
15. * * * * * No suit shall be maintained in any of the courts of
this State to recover damages against any such board, its officers oragents,
on proceedings had and maintained by them to abate and remove such
nuisance and cause of disease, unless it can be shown in such suit, that
the alleged nuisance and cause of disease did not exist, and that the same
was not hazardous and prejudicial to the public health, and unless it be
shown that the said board acted without reasonable and probable cause to
believe that such nuisance did exist, and that such foul or noxious odors,
gases, vapors or other cause was in fact prejudicial and hazardous to the
public health: Laws of 1887, pages 88-9.
While protection is thus afforded to the officer, it must be
observed that the Statute is interpreted so as to prevent these
boards of health from summarily interfering with nuisances
which merely render home uncomfortable, or depreciate the
value of property, or amount to annoyance to individuals
or the. community; so that, in every instance, the board of
health and the court are to determine whether the actual
nuisance, in any reasonable event, would tend to inviting,
generating, fostering, or promoting disease: BiRn, V. C.,
State ex rel. v. Neidt, Ct. Chan. N. J., Jan. 7, 1890.
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Perhaps the reasonableness of this Statute arose from a
previous judgment of the Court of Errors and Appeals, upon
the principle that the legislature could not authorize any
tribunal to render a judgment against the person or property
of the citizen, without a notice and an opportunity to be
heard: Hutton v. City of Camden (1876), 39 N. J. Law 122,
127. There, it had been assumed by the Board of Health,
which ordered the filling up of a lot, and also by the trial
court, that the resolution of the Board of Health was a final
determination of the question of nuisance. In denying
such anionstrous proposition, and sustainingthe action of tres-
pass, Chief Justice BEASLEY found himself supported by the
City of Salem v. Eastern RR. Co. (I868), 98 Mass. 431,
where the City dug a channel for the escape of water con-
fined by the railroad embankment, and sought to recover
the expense, chiefly on the ground that the proceedings of
the City Board of Health were conclusive evidence of the
existence of the nuisance: such weight was denied, as there
seemed no reason, after the abatement of the supposed
nuisance, either in the public exigency or in the justice of
the case, which required "the holding of such exparte ad-
judications final and conclusive to establish the facts"; other-
wise the Court would have held that "no adjudication could
be made in the premises, and no order issued, until the
parties had been notified and heard in their defence": Id. 450.
This Massachusetts case was also followed in Iowa, where
the municipality condemned, and after notice, removed an
old house standing upon private property. The owner's ac-
tion of trespass was allowed by the trial court to be met, by
this defence of the conclusiveness of the municipal declara-
tion that the house was a nuisance. But this was reversed
on appeal, because:
The power to abate implies that there is or may be in existence, some-
thing to be abated. A nuisance must exist before it can be abated. The
power conferred, therefore, authorizes cities and towns to abate an exist-
ing thing. No express power is given to declare that a nuisance exists,
nor do we think that it can or should necessarily be implied. The council
may abate all nuisances, but this does not imply that it can determine
what constitutes a nuisance as an existing thing, for the reason that the
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nuisance must in fact exist. If it does, then it may be abated: SEgvERs,
J., Cole v. Kegler (1884), 64 Iowa 59, 61.
Consequently, in Underwood v. Green (1870), 46 N. Y.
140, the health officer was condemned to pay the value of
forty-two hogs which had been suffocated in the cars. On
arrival at destination, the dead hogs were not offensive or
dangerous to the public health, and the owner was ready
and willing to remove them himself, but was prevented by
the defendant, the city inspector, who seized and carried
away the hogs. Upon the same principle, an injunction
was allowed against a threatened destruction of a.dam erected
under the authority of an Act of the legislature, upon the
express ground that the municipality could not declare a
nuisance for the purpose of abatement: Clark v. Mayor &c.
of Syracuse (1852), 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 32, 34.
Chief Justice BEASLEY did not halt upon such narrow
ground, but went still further, and cut off another travesty
on justice which seems to pervade the minds of municipal
officers :
There is an infirmity in all proceedings of this nature, which lies deeper
than the one just noticed. Assuming the power in this board, derived
from the legislature, to adjudge the fact of the existence of a nuisance,
and also assuming such jurisdiction to have been regularly exercised, and
upon notice to the parties interested, still, I think, it is obvious, that in
a case such as that before the Court, the finding of the sanitary board
cannot operate, in any respect as a judgment at law would, upon the
rights involved. * *
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists, is an authority to find
facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus
made. This is ajudicial function, and it is a function applicable to a nu-
incrous class of important interests. The use of land and buildings, the
enjoyment of water rights, the practice of many trades and occupations,
and the business of manufacturing in particular localities, all fall, on some
occasions, in important respects, within its sphere. To say to a man
that lie shall not use his property as he pleases, under certain conditions,
is to deprive him, pro tanto, of the enjoyment of such property. To find
conclusively against him, that a state of facts exists with respect to the
use of his property, or the pursuit of his business, which subjects him to
the condemnation of the law, is to affect his rights in a vital point. The
next thing to depriving a mian of his property, is to circumscribe him in
its use, and the right to use property is as much under the protection of
law as the property itself, in any other respect, is, and the one interest
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can no more be taken out of the hands of the ordinary tribunals than the
other can. If a man's property cannot be taken away from him except
upon trial by jury, or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain upon
compensation made, neither can he, in any other mode, be limited in the
ise of it.
The right to abate public nuisances, whether we regard it as existing in
the municipalities, or in the community, or in the land of the individual,
,is a Common law right and is derived, in every instance of its exercise,
from the same source-that of necessity. It is akin to the right of de-
stroying property for the public safety, in case of the prevalence of a de-
vastating fire or other controlling exigency. But the necessity must be
present to justify the exercise of the right, and whether present or not,
must be submitted to ajury under the guidance of a court.
The finding of a sanitary committee, or of a municipal council, or of
any other body of a similar kind, can have no effect whatever, for any
purpose, upon the ultimate disposition ofamatterof this kind. Itcannot
be used in evidence in any legal proceeding, for the end of establishing,
finally, the fact of nuisance, and if it can be made testimony for any pur-
pose, it would seem that it can be such only to show that the persons act-
ing in pursuance of it were devoid of that malicious spirit which some-
times aggravates a trespass, and swells the damages: BASLY, C. J.,
Hutton v. City of Camden (1876), 39 N. J. Law 129-131.
This language was considered in he Newark &c. Rwy.
Co. v. Hunt (I888), 5o N. J. Law 308, and the improper
tise of its principles repudiated. The case was trespass for
killing glandered horses, under the orders of the State Board
of Health, and the Company contended that the law author-
izing the action of the Board of Health, was unconstitutional,
because making the determination of the Board of Health
final, without a hearing. But the Court found no such in-
tention in the law, and proceeded to deny that it interfered
with any rights of the owners, because it authorized the
abatement of nuisances before a judicial adjudication. It
did not deny this adjudication, and that at some time after-
wards it might be had, was all the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States secured.
The Amendment was, in my judgment, likewise ineffectual to prevent
the State from providing, under its police powers, for the immediate
abatement of public nuisances actually existing, though not yet judicially
adjudged nuisances. In such case, the officer entrusted with the power of
abatement could not be protected if he destroyed property without the ex-
iqtence of these conditions which make it a common nuisance and justify
its destruction. But if the property owner is not deprived of a right to
BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.
contest the existence of such conditions, and to obtain redress as for a
trespass, if they are not shown to have existed, such legislative acts would
not infringe any constitutional provision: MAGrE, J., Newark &c. Rwy.
Co. v. Hunt (1888) 50 N. J. Law 3o8, 316.
Before closing this division of the subject, caution should
be given that cases falling under general quarantine or other
health regulations, such as disinfecting imported rags: Train
v. Boston Dishzfeclbg Co. (1887), 144 Mass. 523, 531, are
beyond the scope of this article, which deals only with casual
declarations of nuisance.
Ix.
Very much the same principles apply to the declarations
of nuisances prejudicial to life or property: See Cole v. Keg-
le-, supra, page 174. Municipal governments must decide
not what is a nuisance in itself, but what from its character,
location, and surroundings, may become dangerous. The
courts would usurp municipal functions to do more than ex-
amine when the police power is unlawfully exerted: ELLIOTT,
J., Bauingartner v. Hasty (1884), IOO Ind. 575, 577.
The condemnation of wooden buildings and sheds in
crowded locations may require summary execution, as
occurred in the neighborhood of the Centennial Exhibition
of 1876. No doubt was expressed that an action of trespass
would lie against the Mayor of the City of Philadelphia as
an individual, for having caused the destruction of these
wooden buildings; even the defense of erection in violation
of the municipal ordinances was held to be insufficient proof
of a public nuisance: SHARVSWOOD, C. J., Fieldsv. Stokley
1t882), 99 Pa. 3o6, 309, and such was the judgment in
A)zeedler v. Norristown (1882), ioo Id. 368 (a frame stable),
and the principle involved in H-avey v. De-woody el al.
I856), IS Ark. 252 (unoccupied house), and McKibbin v.
Fort Smith (188o), 35 Id. 352 (frame building), though this
was criticised as a narrow view of the subject, by ELLIOTT,
J., in Bazingartner v. Hasty (1884), Ioo Ind. 575, 58I-
In fact, Fields v. Stokley was decided upon the almost ad-
mitted nuisance from proximity to the Exhibition buildings,
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which had been threatened by a fire in the eastern portion
of this Shantytown; from the flimsy character of these
wooden buildings, and from the disorderly characters fre-
quenting the bar-rooms there maintained. Moreover, the
grand jury had presented this neighborhood as a nuisance,
and the judge presiding in the criminal court had directed
the Mayor to abate it on forty-eight hours' notice. All these
facts appeared to the .jury, and their verdict was well
rendered for the Mayor, but the Supreme Court added, with
great significance:
It is true, that a private person, assumiug to abate a public nuisance,
takes upon himself the responsibility of proving to the satisfaction of a
jury; the fact of nuisance. The official position of the defendant, as Mayor
of Philadelphia, did not relieve him from his personal responsibility in
this respect. But he has been sustained by the verdict of the jury, which
is a justification of his alleged trespass: SHARSWOOD, C.J., Fields v. Slok-
ley (1882), 99 Pa., 3o6, 310.
The Pennsylvania Court is not alone in denying that proof
of the existence of a wooden house in violation of a mnuni-
cipal ordinance, is evidence that the house is a nuisance. In
Cleveland, Lenze owned a house standing on leased ground
from a-time anterior to the fire ordinance. The City gave
permission to remove the house, through a public street, to
another lot, and when the house had been started on its way,
the permission to remove was revoked and the house was
torn down by the City officials as an obstruction to the street
wherein it stood when the penission to remove was re-
voked. Lenze was allowed to recover damages because of
the wrongful and forcible deprivation of the use of his prop-
erty ; that is, he had the right to move the house from one
lot to another within the fire limits: City of Clzeland v.
Lenze (1875), 27 Ohio St. 383, 391, The contrary had been
decided in Wadleigh v. Gilan el al. (1835), 12 Me. 403, by
WESTON, C. J., "to prevent the mischief, and effect the
salutary purposes contemplated by the [fire] Ordinance," by
regarding "as within its operation, wooden erections placed
where none existed before, whether nearly built, or removed
.there from some other quarter." This decision has been
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recognized as founded upon the general principle that inmuni-
cipal ordinances must be reasonable, by PrTERS, J., injones
v. Saqford (1877), 66 Me. 585, 589 (leasing of the town hall);
and Portland v. Water Co. (1877), 67 Id. 135, 138 (exemption
from taxation.) By a strict construction, the same result is
reached as in the Lenze case: Br-wn v. Hum (1858), 27
Conn. 332, and Stewart v. Comm. (1840), I0 Vatts (Pa.)
307, but these are not at all cases of summary abatement but
prosecutions for violation of the fire regulations. Upon the
question of repair or extensive alterations, the Pennsylvania
Court declared the latter within the prohibition and the ten-
ant liable to an indictment: Douglass v. The Comm. (183o),
2 Rawle (Pa.) 262.
The subject must be dropped here, as the legality of fire
ordinances is not under examination, but merely their sum-
mary execution.
The attempt to enforce a municipal regulation of steam
boilers, which would make their use dependent upon official
caprice, has, of course, failed; and an injunction would issue
unless the municipality could establish a nuisance: The
Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. Radecke (1878), 49 Md. 217,
where the only complaints were liability of explosion and of
fire from a boiler used in a box factory. The defendant re-
fused to remove the boiler in obedience to a notice issued
under the authority of an Ordinance prescribing neither
guide nor limits to the Mayor's discretion. An injunction
was issued against the City, the Court declaring the ordinance
void as a clearly unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive regu-
lation of a necessary instrument in the prosecution of urban
business enterprises.
Lime kilns cannot be put under the ban of a prohibitive
municipal regulation, without regard to any facts: State v.
Mot (1883), 61 Md. 297, 305, where a demurrer to an indict-
ment was held good, because no averments were made of
such facts as would constitute a nuisance:
And not being nuisances in their nature, irrespective of their local sur-
roundings, it is very clear that there has been no authority conferred upon
the laor aml City Council to make them nuisances, either to health,
i8o SUMMARY CONDEMNATION OF NUISANCES
comfort, or property, by simply declaring them so. In the absence of
such express authority, the principle is too well settled to require the
citation of authorities for its support, that a particular use of property de-
clared a nuisance by an ordinance of a municipal corporation, does not
make such use a nuisance, unless it be so in fact, according to the com-
mon law or statutory definition of nuisance: ALVzY, C. J., State v. folt
(1883), 6i Md. 297, 306.
X.
The summary removal of obstructions in streets, roads
and other highways, is a police or public ministerial power,
designed to operate for the relief of the public, and without
the necessity of adjudication upon things which are apparent
obstructions and evident nuisances: MAGIE, J., State, Dawes,
Prosecutor v. Hightstown (1883), 45 N. J. Law 501, 504
(building condemned); LYoN,J., Goodsell v. Fleming (1883),
59 Wis. 52, 53 (shed); ]EGAN, J., Sheen v. Stothart (1877),
29 La. Ann. 630 (fences). The exercise of -such power de-
pends upon the existence of a lawful street, of an obstruc-
tion in that street, and of such an obstruction as may be
reasonably known (for instance, by sight,) without the settle-
. ment of doubtful rights of property; it is not a power to
interfere with private ownership further than to regulate the
use of individual property in the community: BEDLE, J.,
State, Associates etc. firoseattors v. Jersey City (1869), 34 N.
J. Law 31, 39, 41 (opening streets). So that even if the de-
termination of a road supervisor be within his powers, still
the execution of this lawful determination cannot escape
judicial control, whenever the court is shown that wanton
or even unnecessary injury is the result: Bills v. Belknab
(1873), 36 Iowa 583, 586, where an injunction was granted
against the unnecessary improvement of a country road by
cutting down adjacent forest trees.
That the statutes place the original responsibility of declar-
ing such a nuisance upon the local officer, is, in fact, for the
interest of the individual charged with such offense; so that
an information by the State's attorney, of having committed
an indictable offense at common law within the category of
"a high crime and misdemeanor," by building a stone wall
in a highway, was held bad upon demurrer, as a justice of
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the peace could punish the person, or the selectmen remove
the thing: Stale v. KnaAP (1827), 6 Conn. 415 (stone wall);
State v. Smith (1829), 7 Id. 428 (stone wall); State v. Hyde
(1836), 1i Id. 541, 544 (building). Otherwise-
Is it possible, that a wise legislator, oe a learned, humane and inde-
pendent judge, would doom a fellow citizen to the gallows, or the cells of
Newgate, for erecting a pig pen, or planting a tobacco patch on the high-
way, without impeding the public travel? As well might Hercules be
called upon, by the indolent wagoner, to give him a lift, as the Superior
Court to abate nuisances and remove encroachments from the highways.
"Nec dens intersit, nisi dignus vindice vodus." (Hor. de Art. Poet.):
PzTE s, J., State v. Knaipi (1827), 6 Conn. 415, 418.
The question is one of interference with private property
and must be distinguished from what amounts to the revoca-
tion of a license to use the public highway for private
purposes: Emerson v. Babcock (1885), 66 Iowa 257, where a
platform scale was declared a nuisance and the Court refused
an injunction on the ground that the fee in the street in
question was in the town and there was no legal right to
maintain the scales in the street: moreover there was no
public benefit. This case is probably of no more weight
than given to it in the general statement above, as COOLEY,
C. J., in Everett v. The City "of Afarquelte (1884), 53 Mich.
450, 453, pointed out the revocation of the license did not
convert the structure (in that case, basement steps) into a
nuisance, which was a question for a jury to decide upon
consideration of evidence of inconvenience to the public.
Consequently an injunction was granted in that case.
By the terms of the preceding definition, there must be
no substantial doubt of the existence and limits of the high-
way; because-
Where a person has been in peaceable r ossession of lands, under color
and claim of right, it is not consistent with legal policy to allow him to be
forcibly ejected without legal process: CAMPBELL, J., Sheldon v. Kala-
,nazoo (1872), 24 Mich. 383, 388 (fence in the highway).
No one can be disburbed on his estate, without the right to have his
rights determined by legal process: CAMPBELL, J., Gregory v. Knight
(1883), 50 Mich. 61, 63.
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In the latter case, a proceeding to remove a "rail fence,
stone row, rail piles, hay barn and sheds," as encroachments,
failed, because a claim of right to the ground was inter-
posed, and the legislature had provided an action of trespass
in such case, in lieu of summary proceedings: CAMPBELL,
J., TownshiP of Lebanon v. Burch (1889), 78 Mich. 641,
645-6 (fence in the highway). But generally, the conclu-
sion may be justly drawn from the principle stated above,
that evidence may be required of the fact of a lawful high-
way: Niron v. Town of Biloxi (1889), Sup. Ct. Miss., 5 S.
Repr. 621 (fence across a street); Cook v. Harris (1875), 61
N. Y. 448 (a case of alleged dedication); Sterling Village v.
Pearson (1889), 25 Neb. 684 (where a fence had been erected
across an alley not proved to the court and jury to have a
legal existence). Similarly, Soile v. The State (I865), 19
Wis. 593. Dependent upon this fact, the question of the
power to summarily abate an obstruction as a nuisance can
alone be decided by the court trying the question of an in-
jury to an owner, resulting from the exercise of municipal
power: Hubbard v. iMason City (1884), 64 Iowa 243, where
an indictment for obstructing a highway failed from want of
proof of the lawful establishmpent of the way: Sheldon v.
Kalamazoo (1872), 24 Mich. 383, 386, where the municipal-
ity unsuccessfully sought to escape on the technical objection
that the municipal officers were not the agents of the village.
Hence, this power over nuisances cannot be prostituted to
the opening of public access to a private wharf; the right of
access must be legally established: State, Associates etc. pros-
ecutors v. Jersey City, sufira; nor to the opening of a street
whose exact location is in doubt: State, Bodine et a. Pros.
v. Common Council of Trenton (1873), 36 N.J. Law 198,
202 ; nor the opening of a street without paying or securing
payment for the land taken: Peckhamn v. Henderson (1858),
27 Barb. (N. Y.) 207, 213.
An important consequence ensues from the application of
the above statement to alleys not opened by public authority.
Where such a passage had been dedicated but not fully
opened, and the supposed obstruction was a fence maintained
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in the alley under claim of a freehold title, the municipality
could not indict for maintaining an obstruction against proof
of no interruption of the accustomed passage : Jackson v. The
People (i86o), 9 Mich. III, 122. There was a dissent in
this case; moreover the position of the Court, that the
municipality could not make an ordinance e.v Postfacto, was
untenable. But the judgment was correct, as the fence
would now be considered an encroachment and not an ob-
struction, and therefore beyond the summary powers of the
municipality.
The statement just made must be remembered with the
limitation that questions of dedication are not considered
here ; nor those of nonuser, such as arose in Commz. v. Moore-
head (1888), 118 Pa. 344. Here, nothing finds a place but
the defenses and remedies of a property owner, who has had
a fence, house or other tangible thing summarily condemned
by a local authority.
The disputable question being fairly raised, as if it is
shown to the court that a fence has been maintained within
the lines of a lawful highway, then, in support of his con-
tention, the land owner may defeat the summary power of
abatement and obtain damages for its exercise, by showing
that the public use of the street has not been incommoded:
Pazter v. Albrecht (1882), 72 Wis. 416 (fence condemned);
Hofikins v. C7-omnbrie et al. (1829), 4 N. H. 520. In this
latter case, no injury had actually been suffered by the filling
up of a cellar dug in the highway, and therefore merely
nominal damages were recovered.
The underlying principle of the recovery of damages in
such cases, is the fact that not every encroachment upon a
public highway is a nuisance. The fence, or whatever it
may be, must first become a source of annoyance and incon-
venierce to the public, as the duty of the supervisors is to
cause the removal of obstructions "which seriously interfere
with or impede the" public right of uninterrupted passage:
COLE, J., -Neff v. Paddock el al (1870), 26 Wis. 546, 552
(fence in the highway). This is a question of fact, and not
of law alone, in every case: Becchir v. The Pco le (1878),
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38 Mich. 289, where an alley .had been roofed over, and the
Recorder of Detroit had ruled, as a matter of law, that this
roof created an obstruction. The conviction was quashed
for this error, on an opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J., following
Claqrk v. The Ice Co. (1872), 24 Mich. 508, 512, a case of the
destrnuion of an ice house standing ten feet from the traveled
road. Damages were recovered for this trespass.
The opinion of Chancellor WALWORTH, in Hart et a. v.
Mayor c&c. of Albany (1832), 3 Paige Chan. (N. Y.) 213
(floating store-house in the canal basin), is often quoted in
support of this principle, and so far as the Chancellor asserted
that "The question of nuisance or no nuisance, however, is
always a question of fact, in relation to which the opinions
of individuals will necessarily differ," he was correct: WHIP-
PLE, C. J., The People v. Carpenter (1849), I Mich. 273, 289.
The Chancellor therefore properly remitted the complain-
ants to their legal remedy, notwithstanding his conclusion
that police ordinances were valid, because necessary, amidst
the differing individual opinions.
The People v. Carpenter (1849), I Mich. 273, was an in-
.hktment for obstructing Woodward Avenue in the City of
Detroit, by a stairway occupying a space of four feet square
on the side of the highway next to the house of the defend-
ant. The jury found a special verdict, and the judgment
of the Court below was reserved for the opinion of the
Supreme Court upon this question, which will be seen to go
to the foundation of these supposed municipal rights:
Can the Court pronounce judgment upon such a finding? A nuisance
is defined by Blackstone to be " the doing of a thing to the annoyance of
the King's subjects:" 4 Commen. 167. In the case before us, the thing
done was the erection of the steps mentioned in the verdict: Whether the
ting thus done isan annoyance to the inhabitants of this State, is referred
by the jury to the determination of this Court.
Ordinarily, an indictment for a nuisance cannot be supported unless the
thing complained of is productive of inconvenience to the public. * * *
This inconvenience or annoyance to the public, enters into the definition
of the offence, and must in all cases be proved. These positions are not
questioned by the counsel who represents the people; but it is contended
that the question of inconvenience is a question of law, arising from the
facts stLted inthe special verdict; that the jury having found that Wood-
ward avenue is a highway, and that the defendant erected a flight of steps
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the Court can arrive at a certain conclusion respecting the question of an-
noyance : in other words, that such an obstruction must necessarily be an
annoyance to the public.
But to warrant this position, it would seem necessary to establish
another,-that every obstruction in a highway isa nuisance. The reason-
ing of counsel is, that the public have a right to the use of every part of
the highway; and, having this right, any obstruction must be a nuisance.
As a general legal proposition, it is true that the public have the right to
use every part of a common and public highway; but it by no means
follows, that every obstruction is necessarily a nuisance. "* * * Trees,
awning-posts, hay-scales, and hydrants meet the traveller at every step,
and yet no one regards them as nuisances.
Whether an obstruction be a nuisance, must, then, be a question of fact
for a jury, and not of law for the court: WHIPPLE, C. J., The People v.
Carpenter (1849), I Mich. 273, 287-8, 289.
Similarly, that a question of fact for the determination of
jury, always arises in cases of an encroachment upon a high-
way, was fully recognized by HINMAN, C. J., in Stale v.
ferritt (i868), 35 Conn. 314, 318 (fence in the highway),
explaining Burnhsam v. -Iotchkiss (1841), 14 Conn. 31 I, 319
(stone wall in the highway), whose principles had followed
Hubbardv. Deming (1851), 21 Conn. 356, 36o (fence in the
highway), where WAITE, J., disssenting (page 322), pointed
out that an ornament or improvement of a highway might
not be summarily removed. Also, by MARVIN, J., in the
fence cases of Peckham v. Henderson et al. (1858), 27 Barb.
(N. Y.) 207, and Griffith v. McCallum (I866), 46 Id. 561.
Again, from the character of this power, the discretion of
the municipal authorities in opening a street to its full
width, cannot be defeated at law, by a claim of right to the
ground upon which the obstruction stands: Childs v. Nelson
(1887), 69 Wis. 125, 136 (fences); though equity will restrain
until an action at law can be tried, where the obstruction
has been long tolerated and the public right to the ground
appears uncertain: fanchester Cotton z~lls v. Town of
Mfanchester (1875), 25 Grat. (Va.) 825 (encroaching build-
ings), recognized as authority by BuRxs, J., Sanderlin v.
Baxter (1882), 76 Va. 299, 3o6 (appurtenant ditches). Per-
haps this distinction may be more readily apprehended from
the point of consideration taken in Wisconsin and Michigan.
There, the disputable question of apparent nuisance or not,
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is viewed by the legislature as one of obstruction, and not of
encroachment: COLE, C. J., State v. Pomeroy (1889), 73 Wis.
664 (fence in the highway); SHERWOOD, J., Gorham, High-
Way Com'r v. Withey (1883), 52 Mich. 50, 51 (fences across
the highway), following COOLEY, J., City of Grand Ra zds
v. THughes (1866), 15 Id. 54 (fence and dwelling in a street),
and was again recognized by CAMPBELL, J., McArthur v.
Saginaw (1885), 58 Mich. 357, 360' (lumber pile causing
death of a traveler).
Our laws have always made a distinction between cumbering or ob-
structing a public way, and encroaching upon it. The former term has
been applied to impediments to travel and passage placed in the open
street, and tending to make its use difficult or dangerous; while the
latter has embraced the actual enclosure of a portion of the street by
fences or walks, or occupation by buildings. The mode of dealing with
the two offenses has almost always been different, and the penalties also.
* * The city charters have made the same distinction, and we are not
at liberty to overlook it.
Many reasons may have operated upon the legislative mind to induce
them to make this distinction. Obstructions which "cumber" a street
or walk are commonly the result of carelessness, negligence or mischief,
hnd require prompt remedies; while encroachments usually proceed from
a claim of legal right to the land occupied, and the ordinary legal reme-
dies are sufficient' for the trial of this right. The merchant who allows
his boxes and" barrels needlessly to cumber the street after notice to re-
move them, may properly be fined for his neglect; but we doubt if any
legislature would intentionally authorize ordinances under which one
who many years before, had erected a building upon what he claimed to
be the line of the street, might be ruined by the accumulation of penalties
against him at the rate often dollars a day, if he failed to acquiesce in the
public right, and destroy or remove the building when the notice was
served upon him : CooLiy, J., City of Grand Rapids v. Hughes (i866), i5
Mich. 54, 57-8, 58-9.
Still the Supreme Court of that State has recognized the
difficulty of laying down a general rule for the determination
of this discrimination: The State v. Pomeroy (1889), 73
Wis. 664, 665, and The State v. Leaver (1885), 62 Wis. 387,
392; though an obstruction need not be such as would
necessarily stop travel, if it be something which has been
unlawfully placed upon the highway, with the effect of at
all interfering with the public use, as a barn standing within
the lines of a street directed to be opened to its full width:
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Id. 392, and intentionally maintained: ORtON, J., Paner v.
Albrecht (I888), 72 Wis. 416, 419; that is, where the owner
wilfully kept the barn in the street: ORToN, J., Childs v.
Nelsoni (1887), 69 Wis. 125, 136_ (fence in a street), the re-
visers omitting the word "wilfully" from the statute for the
purpose of reaching mere obstructions, instead of halt-
ing upon the question whether the thing had been obsti-
nately, stubbornly, or perversely intruded : CASSODAY, J., The
State v. SMith (I88I), 52 Wis. 134, 137 (filling a ditch) ; that
is, with legal malice or evil intent in some degree: DIXON,
C. J., State. v _Preston (1874), 34 Wis. 675, 683 (fence in the
highway).
In New York, the statutory distinction between obstruct-
ing a highway and encroaching upon it, did not prevent the
assertion that either of these evils would become a public
nuisance when "annoyance of a real and substantial nature"
ensued, and not the mere existence within the lines of the
highway, of the fence or other thing complained of: MARVIN,
J., in Peckhzam v. Henderson (I858), 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 207,
211, 212, distinguishing Welmore v. Tracy (1835), I 4 Wend.'
(N. Y.) 250, both cases of a fence in the highway.
In this aspect of such cases, the important thing is the
liability of the municipality to respond in damages for re-
moving street obstructions, or zuffer an injunction, on proof
of damage, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the
municipal authorities. For this reason, an injunction re-
straining a city and its marshal from removing a fence and
storm door alleged by them to be street obstructions, was
dissolved for want of proof of such injury as could not be
compensated by damages in a suit at law: Smithl v. jCity of
Oconomowoc (188o), 49 Wis. 694; so that there is no distinc-
tion from the case of a private individual threatening to
abate a nuisance: Pennoyer v. Allen (1881), 51 Wis. 360,
362 (tannery). The test is not the person acting, but
whether or not a mere trespass is threatened: The Kimberly
& Clark Co. v. Hezwilt et al. (1890), 75 Wis. 371, 375 (water
power), following Tison v. City of Mineral Point (1875),
39 Wis. 16o, where the-City was enjoined from summarily
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removing valuable trees and shrubbery alleged to be encroach-
ments, because" no sum of money could replace their growth:
TAYIOR J., Smith v. City of Oconomowoc (188o), 49 Wis-
694, 696, though the attempt to appropriate private land for
public use under this summary power, would have been suf-
ficient ground for an injunction: COLE, C. J., Wren v. Walsh
(1883), 57 Wis. 98, 1O2 (encroaching fence), which was
granted for this reason, in Manchester Cotton Mills v. Town
of Manchester (1875), 25 Grat (Va.) 825 (encroaching build-
ings); Clark v. Mayor &'c. of Syracuse (1852), 13 Barb. (N.
V.) 32 (destruction of a dam).
XI.
The maintenance in good order as well as the first estab-
lishment of streets, alleys, sidewalks and other public pas-
sages, is peculiarly within the supervision of the local author-
ities: Pedrick v. Baiey (1858), 12 Gray (Mass.) 161, 163
(projeciing awning), and Bowman v. City of Boston (1849), 5
Cush. (Mass.) i, 8 ; Treise v. St. Paul (1887), 36 Minn. 526
.(suits for defect in a street); and ordinarily the exercise of a
lawful discretion in such matters is not interferedwith by the
courts: HOLT, C., City of Empiori v. Gilchrist (1887), 37
Kan- 532, 535 (plank driveway across the pavement), the
citizen being remitted to his action at law where the damage
inflicted will be compensated if done in violation of his
rights: Benson v. Waukesha (1889), 74 Wis. 31, 33 (tearing
up sidewalk).
The limits of this article forbid any direct consideration of
the remedies for street encroachments, as distinguished from
obstructions, or of the examples of the various kinds of nui-
sances, or of the compensation for the destruction of private
property, which involves a discussion of the power of eminent
domain, as some courts have regarded such actions as justified
under that power as well as the so-called police power:
American Print Works v. Lawrence (1847), I. Zab. (N. J.)
248 ; Hale v. Lawrence (1848), Id. 714 ; Fieldv. City of Des
Moines (1874), 39 Iowa 575.
BY -MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES.
The case of the Americani Print IWn-ks, just cited, is one
of several which arose out of the destruction of certain ware-
houses in New York City by order of the Mayor, for the pur-
pose of stopping the spread of the great fire of 1835. As
already said on page 164, sira, the right of the Mayor to
do such an act is not to be discussed here further than it in-
volved the quasi-judicial function of deciding when the de-
struction should be ordered. The statute of New York
neither did nor could pretend to take away the right to have
the legal results of the Mayor's action tested in a court of
justice: GREEN, C. J., I Zab. (N. J.) 259; NEvIus, J., on
appeal, Id. 733. Nothing in the subsequent stages of these
cases altered this particular resolution: 2 Zab. 72-117.
Looking into these cases, as well as those in New York
(Slone v. Jfayor, 1840, 25 Wend. 147 and 20 Id. 138;
Afa'or v. Lord, 1837, IS Id. 126 and 17 Id. 285 ; 11fayor v.
Pentz, 1840, 24 Id. 668 ; Russell v. tfayor, 1845, 2 Denio
461, where the statute is printed; Lazcrence v. fayor, 1845,
Id. 491, note), the quasi-judicial function is seen to be not
the result of a new power, but merely of the designation of
the actor under the general authority conferred by necessity.
This, "by the common law," was "left to be exercised at the
peril, and upon the personal accountability of him who shall
resort to it, promising him no other reliance or dependence
for immunity, than the verdict of his peers, to be founded
upon clear and satisfactory evidence of the overwhehning
nature of the approaching calamity, for the staying of which
this hazardous and perilous right was by him exercised:"
SHERMNAN, Senator, in the Court of Errors, 2 Denio 475.
There can be little doubt, upon examining the preceding
cases, that the citizen has ample remedy at law for compen-
sation after the action of the municipality has been coin-
pleted. If there were any need for assurance, the allusion
(sra. page 176) to the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, would furnish a clew
to a full remedy. The possibilities of that Amendment are
not even dimly recognized by the people of this country.
JOHN B. UHLE.
